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Referencias

Lista de estudios sobre la Ley Jones (1930-2018)

1930

Brookings Institution, Porto Rico and its Problems, 1930

“American coastwise shipping laws are a handicap to Porto Rico trade. …The economic significance of this development is that Porto Rican imports and exports alike carry somewhat higher shipping rates than would be the case were Porto Rican traders free to utilize the cheaper carriers of other countries.”

1984

Congressional Budget Office

US Shipbuilding and Shipbuilding Trends and Policy Choices – Jones Act costs the US $1.3 billion for 1983.

1988

Lawrence J. White, International Trade in Ocean Shipping Services:

The United States and the World (Cambridge, MA: American Enterprise Institute, Ballinger Publications, 1988 – Jones Act costs the US $2 billion in 1984.

1930

GAO – The Jones Act – Impact on Alaska Transportation and US military Sealift

Based on estimates, the US built requirements increases costs of transportation in the Alaska trade by about $163 million annually. 

1991

US International Trade Commission USITC

Net welfare gain from removal; 3.1 billion (oceanborne cargo only).

1993

Gary C. Hufbauer and Kimberly A. Elliot, Measuring the Costs of Protection in the US (Washington DC; Institute for International Economics)

Jones Act costs the US  $1.1 billion.

GAO – The Jones Act – Impact on Alaska Transportation and US military Sealift

Based on estimates, the US built requirements increases costs of transportation in the Alaska trade by about $163 million annually. 

1991

US International Trade Commission USITC

Net welfare gain from removal; 3.1 billion (oceanborne cargo only).

1993

Gary C. Hufbauer and Kimberly A. Elliot, Measuring the Costs of Protection in the US (Washington DC; Institute for International Economics)

Jones Act costs the US  $1.1 billion.

1988

1993

The Economic Effects of Significant US Import Restraints – US International Trade Commission

The increased demand for maritime services more than compensates for the lost protection in the cabotage part of this sector, and net output, employment, and exports in this sector, increase by $1.3 billion, 5,000 full-time equivalent workers, and $1.0 billion, respectively.  Imports increase by $517 million because of the increased volume of trade and the elimination of the Jones Act restrictions. 

1994

Maritime Industry Cargo Preference Laws, Estimated Costs and Effects, GAO/RCED-95-34, November 1994

Cargo preference laws add directly to a federal agency’s transportation costs.  In fiscal years 1989 through 1993, the five agencies responsible for the transportation costs of most of the government’s international cargo paid an estimated additional $3.5 billion in transportation costs to ship cargo on US-flag vessels….The $3.5 billion estimate represents about 51 percent of the $6.9 billion spent to ship preference cargo on US-Flag vessels. (In 2015 the GAO did a follow up we discuss  ahead.)

1994

A study on the Impact of Repeal of the Jones Act on the Economy of PR, Puerto Rico Management & Economic Consultants, Inc. for Jaime Morgan Stubbe

The repeal of the Jones Act will cut freight costs by $100 million, out of PR-US freight costs of $961.3 million, which is equal to 10.4 percent of total freight costs.

US International Trade Commission 

2.8 billion welfare gain for eliminating for 1991.  Fall in shipping prices of 26% (oceanborne cargo only).

1995

National Taxpayers Union, Capital Ideas, Jan/ Feb, 1996, p.8 

only 8% of the Gulf War’s supplies arrived on commercial ships.  This discredits the arguments that these ships are needed for military interventions.

1996

1998

The Jones Act, Impact on Alaska Transportation and US Military Sealift Capability – GAO -

Based on our estimates, the US-built requirement increases costs of transportation in the Alaska trade by about $163 million annually.

1999

The Economic Effects of Significant US Import Restraints, Second Update 

US International Trade Commission

$1.3 billions in 1996, estimated 22% decline in prices of shipping services.  If domestic shippers were permitted to buy foreign-made ships, 5 to 12% decline estimated for shipping prices in 1996. (Oceanborne cargo only).

2002

The Economic Effects of Significant US Import Restraints, Third Update – US International Trade Commission

Welfare change of complete liberalization is $656 millions. 

2002

Study of Economic Impact of Cabotage and Alternatives Strategies to Cabotage in US Trade, EG Frankel & Associates

Freight Rates from the US to Jamaica and Dominican Republic were between 25% to 44% less than to PR.  Total impact calculated around $1.1 billion for the Puerto Rico Economy.

2003

Dr. Herrero, Dr. Soriano, Dr. Valentín

Economics Department at the University of Puerto Rico Mayaguez Campus calculated the cost of using US flagged ships in $426 million a year in 2000.

2004

The Economic Effects of Significant US Import Restraints, Fifth update – US International Trade Commission

A widely accepted tenet of economic theory is that non-economic objectives like national defense are achieved most efficiently through targeted, direct interventions like a Naval subsidy, rather than through indirect interventions like the Jones Act import restraints.

2004

The Jones Act, An Economic and Political Evaluation, Richard Smith, MIT

Cabotage has always been a part of the nation's maritime policy, but it is time for part of that policy to be amended. The Jones Act has failed in many of its objectives and it would be beneficial, both to the economy and the maritime industry, to pursue change.

2011

Maritime Administration (MARAD)

COMPARISON OF U.S. AND FOREIGN‐FLAG OPERATING COSTS, - It concludes that the cost of operating US Flagged ships is 2.7 times higher than international and the costs of ships construction is three times higher.  Most of the carriers interviewed expressed they had moved ships to international flags in the previous 5 years or were planning to do so in the next 5 years.  The US oceangoing merchant marine fleet has declined by 82 percent since 1951, when the fleet peaked at 1,268 vessels.  The declines has occurred despite the US government implementing legislation and programs that support the fleet.  As of year-end 2009, the US-flag oceangoing fleet accounted for approximately one percent of the global fleet.

2012

NYFED – Report on the Competitiveness of PR

Argues for a five year exemption of Puerto Rico from the Jones Act. It costs an estimated $3,063 to ship a twenty-foot container of household and commercial goods from the East Coast of the United States to Puerto Rico; the same shipment costs $1,504 to nearby Santo Domingo (Dominican Republic) and $1,687 to Kingston (Jamaica)—destinations that are not subject to Jones Act restrictions.

2012

Impact of the Coastwise Trade Laws on the Transportation System of the United States of America, position statement by Dr. Elías Gutiérrez for the Private Sector Coalition to Exclude Puerto Rico from the Jones Act 

(Presented by PRMA president Rafael Cebollero)

The Merchant Marine Acts of 1920 and 1936 constitute an anachronism in times when globalization has become synonymous with modernization. The Unites States has become a world leader promoting the dismantling of protectionist barriers that hurt competition and impose hidden taxes on American consumers. In this context, the continuation of a clearly protectionist set of measures that can no longer be justified in terms of any of its original objectives constitutes a policy contradiction that must be done away with. Moreover, Puerto Rico bears a disproportionate burden due to an industry subsidy that has become distorted and that does more harm than good to the industry it is supposed to help.

2012

Dr. Valentín and Dr. Alameda, Economic Impact of Jones Act on PR’s Economy

 (Working Paper)

Economics Department at the University of Puerto Rico Mayaguez Campus - Impact of $537 million in 2010.

2013

Estudios Técnicos, Inc., The Maritime Industry in PR- May 2013

Commissioned by the carriers, it admits there is a negative cost differential but argues that other benefits need to be considered to offset the added costs.  In the November-December 2013 magazine “Perspectivas” Villamil discusses the findings of his controversial report and states: “Las tarifas   “southbound”  (SB) son más altas en promedio que las del mercado internacional, pero promediando el costo “northbound” (NB), con tarifas muy bajas y muy por debajo del mercado internacional, resulta en que la tarifa combinada NB y SB es menor que las tarifas a nivel internacional.”

2013

GAO, Characteristics of the Island’s Maritime Trade and Potential Effects of Modifying the Jones Act

Foreign-flag carriers serving Puerto Rico from foreign ports operate under different rules, regulations, and supply and demand conditions and generally have lower costs to operate than Jones Act carriers have.  Shippers doing business in Puerto Rico that GAO contacted reported that freight rates are often-although not always- lower for foreign carriers going to and from the United States, despite longer distances.  However, data were not available to allow us to validate the examples given or verify the extent to which this difference occurred.  According to these shippers, lower rates, as well as the limited availability of qualified vessels in some cases, can lead companies to source products from foreign countries rather than the United States. 

2013

WEF and World Bank, Enabling Trade Valuing Growth Opportunities

The Jones Act is the most restrictive of global cabotage laws and an anomaly in an otherwise open market like the United States….Estimates suggest that more than 500,000 qualifying international containers moved over highway and rail in 2012.  If these containers were allowed to stay on the water and trans-ship on international liner services, the economic benefits to supply chain participants – shippers, carriers and consumers – could exceed US$200 million.  In addition, the potential reduction in road congestion and environmental impact would be significant: trucks and rail are substantially less energy efficient than ocean vessels.

2013

Veiled Waters: Examining the Jones Act’s Consumer Welfare Effect, Justin Lewis, Tulane University, Issues in Political Economy, Vol 22, 77-107

According to my findings, repealing the Jones Act would result in a minimum gain of approximately $578 million to domestic consumer surplus/economic welfare. Meaning: even if there were no change in equilibrium coastal shipping demand and supply, consumers would save » $578 million annually purchasing the same services that they already do.  Additionally, this welfare gain could very reasonably be as high as $682 million a year when taking into account what is known about this industry‟s demand elasticity.

2014

Sink the Jones Act: Restoring America’s Competitive Advantage in Maritime-Related Industries, Heritage Foundation

Repealing the Jones Act would reduce the cost of transporting energy by water because foreign flagged ships could transport oil for an estimated one-third of the cost of US flagged ships.  Repealing the outdated, protectionist Jones Act would promote competition, strengthen the economy, and benefit American consumers.

2015

GAO, International Food Assistance, Cargo Preference Increases Food Aid and Benefits are Unclear

Cargo preference requirements (equivalent to the Jones Act for government transportation) increased the costs of shipping food aid by 23%. 

2015

EconoAnalítica, The Impact of the Jones Act on the Economy of PR,

Discussion paper commissioned by the Francisco Carvajal Foundation

Efforts should be focused on specific exemptions to the Jones Act, for example the requirements that ships be constructed in U.S. shipyards, and so on, instead of striving for the difficult task of a full repeal of the law. 2. Assign funds to commission an independent entity to carry a comprehensive study regarding the effects of the Jones Act. 3. Make efforts to exempt Puerto Rico from certain stipulations of the Jones Act such as those related to the transportation of petroleum and natural gas, such that U.S. shipping companies may use leased or bought foreign vessels for transporting these items between the United States and Puerto Rico. 4. A concerted effort should be made between the economic, social and political sectors to formally request the government of the United States to exempt Puerto Rico from requirements of the Jones Act, following international agreements of which is signatory.

2015

Report by PR Senator, Hon. Rossana Lopez, on Senate Resolution 237, Jones Act of 1920 and Puerto Rico

Strongly argues for repeal. 

2015

Anne O. Krueger, Ranjit Teja, and Andrew Wolfe, Puerto Rico – A Way Forward -

Argues for Puerto Rico to be exempted.  Exempting Puerto Rico from the US Jones Act could significantly reduce transport costs and open up new sectors for future growth. In no mainland state does the Jones Act have so profound an effect on the cost structure as in Puerto Rico.  All islands, remote from the centers of economic activity, suffer from high transportation costs. But Puerto Rico does so disproportionately, with import costs at least twice as high as in neighboring islands on account of the Jones Act, which forces all shipping to and from US ports to be conducted with US vessels and crews. Even those that consider the negative effects of the Jones Act to be exaggerated – e.g., outbound cargo rates are lower than inbound ones, as ships would rather not return empty – concede it is a clear net negative.

2016

Suárez-Gómez, W. y Ayala-Cruz, J. El cabotaje marítimo en la cadena de suministros agrícola de Puerto Rico. Estudios Gerenciales

La experiencia de la liberalización total de las MNT del cabotaje en Nueva Zelanda evidenció una reducción de hasta 24% en los costos de flete en contenedores regulares. Sin embargo, en los refrigerados tan solo fue de entre 2 y 10% (Liu, 2009). Uno de los aspectos que más se resalta de dicha experiencia fue la existencia de varias empresas marítimas (mayormente nativas) que operaban terminales portuarios de considerable actividad. En varios SIDS se han identificado comportamientos tipo cartel, particularmente cuando el número de empresas operadoras marítimas es inferior a 4. La documentación recopilada muestra que actualmente en PR, Hawái y Alaska, el número de operadores domésticos es igual o inferior a 3 y en posiciones de dominancia desbalanceada.

2016

THE JONES ACT: Protectionism V. Global Trade, alliance For Innovation and Infraestructure (Aii) – Focus on energy-

As America finally engages the international energy market this year, it is counterintuitive that protectionist legislation such as the Jones Act still stands, making the cost of domestic trade more expensive. The future holds new and untapped prospects for trade, innovation, and economic stimulus, but the best way to optimize that opportunity is ensuring that U.S. trade policy overly consistent and equipped to deal with current global trade requirements. Step one was repealing the crude oil export ban, step two needs to follow in haste, revising a law that increases costs, encourages inefficiency, dampens innovation, kills competition, and penalizes island economies.

2016

Cabotage: The effects of an external non-tariff measure on the competitiveness of agribusiness in Puerto Rico, Suárez II Gómez, William, thesis University of Bradford

Liberalization should produce more providers. This would result in some changes in competition and the cost of trade might be lower. The cost of importing raw materials would be lower because of the reduction in the rates of transport. A reduction in the grain freight rates would be beneficial for the livestock producers due to the fact that animal feed is their main operational cost.

2017

An Economic Analysis of the Jones Act, Mercatus Center, George Mason University

But by denying American businesses access to the best shipping, the act has imposed large losses on American consumers. Recent developments in the world economy, including globalization of ownership, offshore outsourcing of ship components, and extensive use of flags of convenience, have made the act even more burdensome. Since recent contributions of the merchant marine to national security have been small or negative, major reform of the Jones Act is overdue. Such reform would be consistent with the goal of eliminating excessive regulation of the American economy.

2018

CATO Institute

By any measure, the Jones Act has been a failure. Under its watch the U.S. shipbuilding industry has atrophied, its shipping fleet has withered, and any contribution to the mili­tary’s sealift capability has been trivial at best. The failure of the Jones Act to meet its intend­ed objectives, meanwhile, has inflicted con­siderable economic harm through a variety of direct and indirect channels. Rather than serv­ing to bolster national security, the Jones Act has stultified domestic shipbuilding, dimin­ished the size of America’s merchant marine reserve, and hamstrung our ability to respond expeditiously and effectively to natural and manmade disasters.

2018

Transformation and Innovation in the Wake of Devastation, An economic and Disaster Recovery Plan for PR, preliminary Draft July 2018

Recommended permanent exemption from Jones Act.

2018

Fiscal Management Oversight Board, Independent Investigator, KOBRE & KIM LLP, August 2018, Page 37

The Jones Act further imposed stringent requirements on shipping between Puerto Rico and the US mainland and within Puerto Rico… The increased costs resulting from this reduced competition are especially acute for Puerto Rico, given its heavy reliance on the transport of goods to and from the mainland United States and the added burden of transporting internally in Puerto Rico on US carriers... Additionally, the Jones Act has made the price for shipping goods from the US to Puerto Rico to be higher than shipping from a foreign country to Puerto Rico, which has a concurrent effect on the cost PREPA pays to bring oil to the island. See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-13-260, Puerto Rico: Characteristics of the Island’s Maritime Trade and Possible Effects of Modifying the Jones Act, Highlights (Mar. 2013).

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